Studies in International Taxation by David Harris et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Studies in International Taxation
Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Giovannini, R. Glen Hubbard, and Joel Slemrod,
eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-29701-2
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/giov93-1
Conference Date: Sept. 26-28, 1991
Publication Date: January 1993
Chapter Title: Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations
Chapter Author: David Harris, Randall Morck, Joel B. Slemrod
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8001
Chapter pages in book: (p. 277 - 308)8  Income Shifting in U.S. 
Multinational Corporations 
David Harris, Randall Morck, Joel Slemrod, and 
Bernard Yeung 
By their very nature, multinational corporations trade goods, services, finan- 
cial capital,  and intangible assets across national borders within their enter- 
prise. By using artificial transfer prices in these transactions and concentrating 
debt financing in highly taxed subsidiaries, a multinational can shift taxable 
income within its group of companies to reduce its overall tax burden and to 
achieve other objectives, such as bypassing capital controls. From a country- 
policy perspective,  such behavior can affect tax revenues and the level and 
location  of  investment  and  employment.  From  a  firm-policy  perspective, 
questions arise as to the mechanics,  costs, benefits,  and thus optimality of 
such behavior. 
Surprisingly little evidence on income shifting based on firm-level data is 
available. In this paper, we present such evidence. We find that U.S. manufac- 
turing firms with subsidiaries in low-tax countries have relatively low U.S. tax 
payments per dollar of assets or sales. Furthermore, having a subsidiary in a 
high-tax region is associated with higher U.S. tax payments. These results 
suggest that U.S. manufacturing companies do engage in this sort of income 
shifting. 
After reviewing the limited existing empirical literature in section 8.1, we 
David Harris is a graduate student at the School of  Business Administration,  University of 
Michigan.  Randall Morck  is professor  at the Faculty of  Business,  University of  Alberta.  Joel 
Slemrod is Jack D. Sparks Whirlpool Corporation Research Professor of Business Administration 
and professor of economics at the University of Michigan and a research associate at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Bernard Yeung is professor at the School of Business Administra- 
tion, University of Michigan. 
The authors are grateful for helpful comments by Harry Grubert, Jack Mutti, James Wheeler, 
Peter Wilson, and seminar participants at the University of  Michigan’s Workshop on Tax Policy 
Research, the University of California-Los  Angeles, the University of Michigan, I’Universit6 de 
Montrtal, the Northern Finance Association, and the NBER Summer Institute’s International Tax- 
ation Workshop. The authors also thank the Center for International Business Education at the 
School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, for providing financial support. 
277 278  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
present our empirical framework and data in section 8.2. In section 8.3, we 
report cross-firm regression results that  are consistent with the notion that 
multinational firms shift income from high-tax locations to the United States 
and from the United States to low tax locations, thus reducing their overall tax 
liabilities. In sections 8.4 and 8.5, we discuss statistical and economic issues 
that might affect our results. In section 8.6, the economic significance of our 
results is addressed. Section 8.7 concludes the paper. 
8.1  Review of the Literature 
There is a substantial literature on the extent to which the internal pricing 
policies of multinationals are influenced by tax factors. Alworth’s (1989) re- 
view of this literature suggests the importance of tax considerations but also 
points to the impact of market structure, the nature of  product markets, and 
limitations on profit repatriation. 
Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that tax-motivated income shift- 
ing by  U.S.  multinationals occurs. Wheeler (1988) describes U.S. tax court 
cases where income was apparently shifted for tax reasons. In one example, 
G. D. Searle in  1975 had an average return on employed assets of  -42.3 
percent in the United States and 119 percent in Puerto Rico-a  zero effective 
tax  rate jurisdiction.  Of  course,  anecdotal evidence does not  establish the 
economywide prevalence of income shifting. 
There have been two recent empirical attempts to uncover systematic evi- 
dence of  income shifting by  examining observable variables that should be 
affected by  it. Grubert and Mutti (1991), using cross-country aggregate data 
on U.S. multinationals’ affiliates, regress two measures of affiliate profitabil- 
ity in  1982 against the host country’s statutory corporate income tax rate (or 
tax holiday rate if one was generally available). They run similar regressions 
on a measure of the average tax rate: the ratio of foreign taxes paid to book 
income of U.S  .-controlled corporations with positive profits. The growth of 
the host country’s gross domestic product is included as a proxy for econo- 
mywide pretax profitability. 
They find a significant and large negative relationship between either mea- 
sure of  foreign taxes and either measure of  foreign affiliate profitability. In 
other words, firms declare more income in low-tax jurisdictions. This is con- 
sistent with income shifting. The magnitude of the estimated effect is note- 
worthy. In their favored regression, a drop in the statutory tax rate from 40 
percent to 20 percent implies an increase in the ratio of  after-tax profits to 
sales from 5.6 percent to 12.6 percent and an increase in the after-tax rate of 
return on equity from 14.2 percent to 20.7 percent. Clearly, these results im- 
ply that a lower tax rate is associated with a higher pretax rate of return and 
do not simply reflect a smaller slice taken by  taxation out of an unchanging 
level of profitability. 
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on U.S. nonbank majority-owned foreign affiliates. They investigate  the effect 
of host-country tax rates’ on the location of U.S. multinationals’ pretax non- 
financial profits, pretax financial profits (i.e., net interest income), total prof- 
its, and factors of production. Using regression analysis, they find a negative 
relation between all of these variables and host-country average tax rates. 
The results in both Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1990) are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the reported income of U.S. multination- 
als’ foreign affiliates tends to appear in countries with low corporate income 
tax rates. Moreover, Hines and Rice argue that the apparent success of  tax 
haven countries in attracting taxable income is not obviously a bad thing for 
U. S. welfare. Because the U.S. taxes its resident multinationals on a residual 
basis, moving the location of their income from a high-tax foreign country to 
a low-tax foreign country may increase the total taxes paid that are received 
by  the U.S. Treasury. However, to the extent that taxable income migrates 
from the United States to a foreign country, the U.S. Treasury is a clear loser. 
In any case, neither Grubert and Mutti nor Hines and Rice directly address the 
extent of income shifting between the United States and other countries. Both 
focus on income shifting between foreign affiliates. A more complete picture 
of  income shifting by  U.S. multinationals requires an assessment of  income 
shifting to and/or from the U.S. parent. That is the issue we address in this 
paper. 
7.2  Methodology 
Our objective is to uncover systematic evidence of  income shifting, using 
firm-level data. Because shifted income is by nature difficult to observe di- 
rectly, we attempt to predict its impact on observable variables, a methodology 
not different from that in Grubert and Mutti (1991) or Hines and Rice (1990). 
We  start with a firm’s current U.S. tax, denoted as T,  = 73,. where T, is 
the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate and R,  is reported U.S. taxable income. 
For simplicity of exposition, we assume a linear tax function. R,  can be de- 
composed into 
where Y,  is actual U.S. income, Y,,  is income shifted from the United States 
to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions, and Y,,  is income shifted from subsid- 
iaries  in  high-tax regions  to  the  United  States.  Total  U.S.  tax  liability, 
Tu = 7,(Yu  - YUL  + Y,,),  unlike its component parts, is reported by most 
firms  and  is  therefore  readily  observable.  The  relationship  between 
1. They define the  average tax rate as the  lesser of  the benchmark survey tax rate and the 
statutory rate. For some tax-haven countries where these data are unavailable, they obtain the tax 
rate from the Economist’s Tax Havens and Their Uses. 280  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
T,(  Y, - Y,,  + Y”,)  and a firm’s presence in locations with tax rates different 
from the U.S. tax rate reveals information about Y,,  and Y”,.  Hence, we at- 
tempt to use regression analyses to uncover the relation between a U. S. firm’s 
U.S. tax payment and the firms’ presence in foreign locations with different 
tax rates. 
As a starting point, we assume that the choice of where to operate is exog- 
enous and unrelated to the income shifting decisions with which we are pri- 
marily concerned. This is meant as a simplifying assumption, not as a state- 
ment about how we think the world works. The empirical implications of it 
not holding are discussed in sections 8.5 and 8.6.2  This assumption allows us 
to treat the location of foreign operations as independent variables in the fol- 
lowing regression: 
(2)  = gHd$ + g”d;  + bzi, +  , 
where T, is U.S. tax liability, S,  is a scaling factor;fand t are firm and time 
subscripts, respectively; d$  and d;  are vectors of dummy variables indicating 
firmfs  presence in various high-tax and low-tax regions, respectively, in pe- 
riod t; zfl  is a vector of control variables; g”, g“, and b are vectors of regression 
coefficients; and E@ is an error term. 
The hypothesis we test is that the elements of  gH are positive, while those 
of gL are negative. This hypothesis presumes that operating in a high-tax coun- 
try induces income shifting to the United States and that operating in a low- 
tax country induces income shiftingfrom the United States. 
Our sample consists of two hundred U.S. manufacturing firms selected ran- 
domly from the SIC 3000 industries of the primary, supplementary, and ter- 
tiary industry file listing of  Compustat. Compustat data from 1984 through 
1988 are supplemented with data from company annual reports.3 
The dependent variable is the firm’s current taxes payable to the federal 
government net of investment tax credits. It is retrieved from Compustat (item 
63) and then verified by  cross-checking with annual reports and tax notes.4 
2. Our empirical  investigation  focuses on the relationship between income shifting and the 
locations of a firm’s foreign affiliates. Investment decisions are based mainly on very  long run 
considerations such as expected future input costs, the availability of infrastructure, nontax gov- 
ernment policies, and expected product market growth. There are long lags in formulating and 
implementing  investment  plans, and there are also large adjustment costs to altering ongoing 
investment strategies. Thus, decisions about the location of foreign direct investment are arguably 
only tangentially related to income shifting opportunities. Our future research is aimed at explor- 
ing this issue. 
3. Data obtained from annual reports are dated according to the Compustat dating convention, 
as described in the Industrial Cornpustat UserS Manual published by Standard and Poor’s Com- 
pustat Services, Englewood, CO 801 12. 
4.  Raw Compustat data and cross-checked data generate similar results. Note that current U.S. 
federal taxes as reported in a company’s annual report are an estimate of the actual tax liability 
made at the time the report is published (usually January). Dworin (1985) finds that this estimate 
is generally greater than the actual tax payment. The principal causes of this discrepancy are the 
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We  drop observations where the firm’s current U.S.  federal tax liability is 
zero, because firms in this situation may face different income shifting incen- 
tives from those described above.5 After excluding these cases and observa- 
tions with missing data, we obtain a sample of 486 firm-years that are quite 
evenly distributed over the five sample years. 
A firm’s U.S. income is likely to be roughly proportional to the size of its 
U.S. operations. We  want to explain income shifting, Y,,  - Y,,,  using total 
U.S. federal taxes, T, = TJY, - Y,,  + YHu).  Dividing the latter variable 
by the size of U.S. operations allows us to interpret variations in the resulting 
ratio (after controlling for other obvious predictors of U.S. taxable income) as 
due to income shifting. This procedure also reduces the potential for hetero- 
scedasticity problems. The scaling variables used, total U.S.  sales and  the 
total  book value of  U.S.  assets, are obtained directly from financial state- 
ments. A company must report a rough geographic breakdown of its sales and 
assets if foreign sales or assets exceed 10 percent of U.S. sales or assets. If a 
geographical breakdown is not reported in a given year and the firm has no 
foreign subsidiaries at that time, its total sales and assets are treated as U.S. 
sales and assets. If foreign subsidiaries exist but no geographical breakdown 
of sales and assets is presented, we exclude the observation on the grounds of 
missing data. 
In some specifications, we include seven independent variables to control 
for differences in firm characteristics that may have direct or indirect effects 
on a firm’s pretax profitability and tax position. The variables are research and 
development spending, advertising spending, depreciation and amortization, 
rental expenses, investment tax credits, interest expenses, and number of em- 
ployees. The last variable is meant to capture wage expenses, which are un- 
available in Compustat for over 90 percent of our observations. All the control 
variables are obtained from Compustat6 and are worldwide consolidated fig- 
ences in the extent of consolidation in financial reports versus IRS tax reports. To the extent that 
the audit cushion is larger for firms that are more aggressive tax minimizers, it should reduce our 
chances  of  finding evidence of  income shifting.  Consolidation for financial reporting  is more 
extensive than for IRS tax reporting. Important aliates  included in the former but not in the latter 
are foreign affiliates with U.S.  income, domestic international sales corporations (DISCS),  Puerto 
Rican corporations, and some financial affiliates such as insurance,  investment, and real estate 
companies. Given our objective, the more extensive consolidation for financial reports is appro- 
priate. Note that provisions for future repatriated income in financial statements are considered 
deferrals and thus are not included in estimated current tax expenses. 
5.  In this panel, 68 percent of the firm-years have positive U.S. federal taxes,  13 percent have 
negative U.S. federal taxes, and 19 percent have zero U.S. federal tax.  Our results are similar for 
the full sample, for the subsample without observations with zero U.S.  federal tax, and for the 
subsample including only observations with positive U.S.  federal taxes. For the subsample that 
includes only observations with negative U.S. federal taxes, the results are similar to those we 
report but are less significant. 
6. These variables are assumed to be zero if the Compustat reports 0.0001 (unavailable obser- 
vation) or O.OOO8 (insignificant observation) and all other financial data are available. The number 
of employees is considered missing if Compustat reports 0.0001 or 0.0008. 282  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
ures.’ These control variables are scaled by either the firm’s worldwide sales 
or its worldwide assets to match the scaling factor used in the dependent vari- 
able. 
All of these independent variables have a tax shield effect and should there- 
fore be related to lower U.S. tax liabilities. However, some of them may also 
capture other effects that  increase tax liability.  Research and  development 
spending or advertising spending may proxy for the presence of intangible 
assets that increase the return to foreign direct investment (Morck and Yeung 
1991, 1992). 
Finally, in certain specifications, we introduce industry dummies based on 
three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes to control for interin- 
dustry differences in profitability and tax burdens. 
The independent variables that we focus on are the elements of d;  and d;. 
They are categorical variables indicating a firm’s presence in high-tax and 
low-tax jurisdictions. To  operationalize this notion, we divide the non-U.S. 
world into thirteen regions (for descriptions, see table 8.1 footnotes), which 
we place in one of five groups according to how readily they can be classified 
as high- or low-tax jurisdictions: 
1. Regions with a statutory tax rate higher than that of  the United States: 
Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and high-tax countries in Western 
Europe 
2. Regions with a statutory tax rate lower than that of  the United States: 
low-tax countries in Western Europe, the “Four Dragon” Asian countries, and 
other noncommunist Asian countries 
3. Extremely low-tax regions: Ireland and tax havens 
4.  Regions affected by capital controls or other political concerns: South 
5. Others: Africa and OPEC countries 
Africa and Latin America 
Subsidiaries in communist countries are ignored both because they are very 
rare and because they are subject to idiosyncratic policies on earnings repatri- 
ation. 
We  determine the multinational structure of each firm in each year, using 
various issues of the International Directory  of  Corporate Afiliations.  The 
vectors d$  and d$  consist of ones and zeros indicating the presence or absence 
of any subsidiaries in the high-tax and low-tax regions, respectively.8  For ex- 
ample, if  a firm has two subsidiaries in Hong Kong, one in Japan, and three 
7. Geographic breakdowns of these variables are not available. 
8. We count only subsidiaries in measuring a firm’s presence in overseas locations. Branches 
and representative offices are not included. For tax purposes, branch income is consolidated with 
that of U.S. operations. Thus, income shifting among branches is likely much less effective, if not 
totally ineffective, in reducing  a firm’s tax burden. The definition of  a subsidiary is that in the 
International Directory of Corporate Afiliarions (1985/1986): “A chartered business whose shares 
are owned, in whole or in part, by another company. The level of ownership is generally greater 
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in England; the vectors contain ones in the three columns for Four Dragons, 
Japan, and high-tax Western Europe and zeros elsewhere. 
We  use indicator dummies rather than the tax rates themselves, for several 
reasons. First, as Hines and Rice (1990) point out, calculating a representative 
tax rate for a country is notoriously diffi~ult.~  Second, income shifting may be 
motivated by  reasons other than tax  minimization, such as risk avoidance, 
bypassing capital controls, or reducing tariff payments. Moreover, the effect 
of  tax differentials on income shifting depends critically on the regulatory 
environment. These effects lead to nonuniform relations between tax rate dif- 
ferentials and shifted income and make it difficult if  not impossible to devise 
a manageable empirical approach along these lines. By  using carefully de- 
signed regional dummies, we can capture a net income shifting effect due to 
tax minimization and these other factors. 
If the amount of income shifting depends on the size of a firm’s operations 
in the various jurisdictions involved, our use of  indicator dummies could ren- 
der our results noisy and therefore less reliable. On the other hand, if income 
shifting requires only the firm’s presence in the various jurisdictions, our spec- 
ification is preferable. Since a detailed geographic breakdown of the extent of 
non-U.S. operations is not available in general, the point cannot be resolved 
here. 
In table 8.1 we list the regions, their representative corporate tax rates, and 
the expected signs of the regression coefficients of the regional dummy vari- 
ables.’O The corporate tax rates are reported merely to provide a glimpse of 
the differences between the tax rates in these regions and the U.S.  tax rate. In 
general, we expect the regression coefficients of  the dummies indicating a 
firm’s  presence in  higher-tax regions to be positive and those indicating a 
firm’s presence in lower-tax regions to be negative. 
The extent of income shifting is affected by its cost, holding tax rate differ- 
entials constant. Hence, our explanatory variables should include measures of 
this cost. Income shifting is usually conducted via artificial transfer prices” 
9. According to Hines and Rice, “No single measure of  the corporate income tax rate can 
accurately capture the precise difference in tax burdens corporations face in different countries. 
For one thing, the complexity of  tax codes (including different provisions for tax deductions, 
depreciation rules, loss carry forwards and carry backs, and nonstandard income concepts) pre- 
cludes the possibility of distilling a well-defined tax rate for each country. In addition, a single tax 
rate cannot capture industry and firm specific tax holidays or other features” (p. 42). 
10. We calculate the corporate tax rates using data from Price Wuferhouse  Corporare Taxes: A 
Worldwide Summary  (1984, 1988). For the countries in each region, we collect the corporate tax 
rate applicable to foreign-owned subsidiaries. The tax rates chosen apply to income arising from 
the manufacture and sale of goods in the host country. If progressive tax rates are provided, the 
highest rate is used.  If there are dual rates on repatriated and retained earnings, we record the 
lower rate. State and local income taxes are included in the reported rate, net of federal tax deduc- 
tions allowable. If more than one state tax rate is provided, a simple average is used.  Value-added 
taxes, tariffs,  and withholding  taxes on dividends, royalties,  and rents are excluded.  Also ex- 
cluded are tax holiday rates and other specialty tax rates. 
11. These transfer prices include accounting prices used for intracompany exchanges of goods 
as well as services from intangibles, tangibles, and financial assets. 284  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
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!These are average corporate tax rates based on Price Waterhouse Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide 
Summary  (1984, 1988). See text footnote 10 for details. 
*Expected signs of regression on coefficients for dummy variables indicating presence of subsid- 
iaries there. 
’Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Tax holidays are available in all except Hong 
Kong, so statutory rates overstate the tax burden. 
41ndia and Pakistan skew the mean upward. Most countries here have lower rates than the United 
States. 
5Switzerland,  Luxembourg, and Malta. Tax holidays are not factored into the rate reported. 
6A rate of 0 percent applies if the firm qualifies for a tax holiday. 
’While the tax differentials for these regions appear to be negative, these regions are well known 
to have significant political risks or capital controls. Hence, the sign for the regression coefficient 
of these regions is uncertain. 
8Tax havens include Andorra, Antigua, Bermuda, Bahamas,  Barbados, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Nether- 
lands Antilles, other Caribbean, St. Kitts-Nevis,  St. Vincent, and Vanuatu. Substantial tax holi- 
days are available, so statutory rates greatly overstate the actual tax burden. 
that deviate from true economic prices. Caves (1986, ch. 8, 246-47)  argues 
that there are two constraints on such behavior. First, the use of artificial trans- 
fer prices and multiple books can lead to internal confusion and suboptimality 
in a firm’s operation. Second, income shifting is constrained by tax collectors’ 
monitoring efforts. While the validity of the former is an empirical issue, the 
second constraint is undeniable.  l2 
In dividing the world into regions, we attempt to control for differences in 
12. Wilson (ch. 6 in this volume), in a case study of nine firms with sophisticated tax planning 
procedures, finds that some firms do use multiple sets of books and that tax collectors’ efforts to 
restrict transfer pricing have been stepped up in recent years. 285  Income Shifting in U. S. Multinational Corporations 
the cost of income shifting. We  bundle together countries that have  similar 
business climates and tax enforcement regimes, as well as similar statutory 
tax rates. The SIC code dummies introduced to control for interindustry dif- 
ferences in  tax burdens may also control, to some extent, for interindustry 
differences in the cost of income shifting. 
Still, substantial differences in income shifting costs might exist within in- 
dustries. The presence of  intangible assets may  reduce the cost of  income 
shifting. Intangible assets, by  their very nature, do not have readily available 
arm’s-length prices, and therefore the usual regulatory guidelines for estab- 
lishing transfer prices are not easily enforceable. Furthermore, the prices ap- 
plied to transferring intangibles can often be  set as lump sums (e.g., patent 
fees) so that no wedge is driven between marginal costs and benefits related 
to production. Some of our independent variables capture the presence of in- 
tangible assets. Research and development spending proxies for the presence 
of technological expertise, while advertising expenditure proxies for market- 
ing skill. 
Debt financing may also facilitate income shifting. Tax deductions relating 
to interest expenses can be concentrated in highly taxed subsidiaries. Thus, 
interest expenses may also proxy for a low cost of income shifting. 
We  therefore investigate the interaction effect of these measures of the cost 
of  income shifting with the location dummies. We  expect that indicators of 
low-cost income shifting should increase the absolute values of the regression 
coefficients of the regional dummies. 
8.3  Empirical Evidence 
Table 8.2 contains univariate statistics for the variables described above. 
The ratio of  U.S. federal tax to U.S. assets has a mean of  .0314, while the 
ratio of U.S. federal tax to U.S. sales has a mean of  .0231. Both have sizable 
standard deviations of about 1.5 times their means. Negative values of these 
variables exist because of tax refunds. 
In 50.6 percent of our observations, the firm is multinational, having at 
least one foreign subsidiary. In 49.8 percent of  the observations, there is at 
least one subsidiary in high-tax European countries-the  most popular loca- 
tion for foreign direct investment. Canada is the second-most popular host 
country: 41.6 percent of the observations record at least one subsidiary there. 
Following Canada are Latin America (27.8 percent), Japan (26.1 percent) and 
AustralidNew Zealand (24.5 percent). Among the low-tax regions, the Four 
Dragons are the most popular (19.8 percent), followed by low-tax European 
countries (15.8 percent), with the noncommunist Asian countries being the 
least popular (9.3 percent). Ireland (13.0 percent) appears to be more popular 
than the other tax haven countries (9.1 percent). The least popular location 
overall for subsidiaries is Africa (2.7 percent). 
Table 8.3 reports unweighted average U. S. federal tax liabilities (scaled 286  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
Table 8.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Sample  Standard 
Variable  Size  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variables 
U.S . tax/U.S . assets  475 
U.S. tax/U.S. sales  486 
Multinational dummy  486 
Canada  486 
Japan  486 
Four Dragons  486 
Asia  486 
Low-tax Europe  486 
High-tax Europe  486 
Ireland  486 
AustralidNew Zealand  486 
Latin America  486 
South Africa  486 
Africa  486 
OPEC  486 
Tax havens  486 
R&D/sales  486 
Advertisinglsales  486 
Depreciationhales  486 
Employee/sales  480 
Renusales  486 
ITC/sales*  486 
Interest expensesisales  486 
R&D/assets  475 
Advertising/assets  475 
Depreciation/assets  475 
Employees/assets  469 
RenVassets  475 
ITC/assets*  475 
Interesuassets  475 
Multinational structure dummies 
Control variables scaled by worldwide sales 
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Note:  The multinational  firm indicator  and regional  dummies  are zero or one.  Their means  are  the 
fraction of firms that are multinational and the fraction of firms that have at least one subsidiary in the 
indicated region. The countries included in each region are listed in the footnotes to table 8.1. 
*ITC = Investment tax credits. 
separately by  U.S.  assets and U.S. sales) for firms grouped by the locations 
of  their subsidiaries. For instance, the first row reports these two values for 
the firms in our sample with at least one subsidiary in Canada. These first- 
pass results generally conform to expectations. Compared to the average tax 
ratios of  purely domestic U.S. firms (reported in the last row), the average 
U.S. tax ratios of  firms with subsidiaries in higher-tax locations are higher, 287  Income Shifting in U. S. Multinational Corporations 
Table 8.3  Unweighted Average U.S. Federal Tax per Dollar of U.S.  Assets and 
of U.S. Sales, by Location of Foreign Subsidiaries* 
~~ 
Location of  U.S. Taxes  U.S.  Taxes 
Subsidiary  U.S. Assets  U.S. Sales 
Canada  0.03493  0.02271 
Japan  0.03658  0.02784 
Four Dragons  0.02812  0.01768 
Asia  0.02807  0.01  894 
Low-Tax Europe  0.03733  0.02476 
High-Tax Europe  0.03308  0.02392 
Ireland  0.02751  0.01756 
AustralidNew Zealand  0.03204  0.02102 
Latin America  0.03502  0.02171 
South Africa  0.04574  0.02782 
Africa  0.02289  0.0121 1 
OPEC  0.01832  0.01 109 
Tax  havens  0  .O 1278  0.00947 
All multinationals?  0.03300  0.0240  1 
Purely domestic firmst  0.0299  1  0.02232 
*Note that a firm with several subsidiaries may  be included in more than one group. 
?Overall means for firms with any foreign subsidiary anywhere. 
$Overall means for firms without any foreign subsidiaries. 
while those of firms with subsidiaries in lower-tax locations are lower. The 
average tax ratios of firms with tax haven subsidiaries are by far the lowest. 
One exception to this pattern is that average tax ratios of firms with subsidi- 
aries in low-tax European countries are higher than those of domestic firms. 
Note also that the average U.S. tax ratios of firms with South African subsid- 
iaries are higher than those of domestic firms. This suggests income shifting 
from South Africa to the United States. 
Table 8.4 presents our key regression results. In regressions (1) through (4), 
the dependent variable is U.S. federal taxes paid per dollar of U.S. assets; in 
(5) through (8),  the dependent variable is U.S. federal taxes paid per dollar of 
U.S.  sales. Even-numbered  regressions  include three-digit  SIC code dum- 
mies.  Regressions  (3), (4),  (7),  and (8) include the seven control variables 
described above. 
The results  are  almost uniformly  consistent  with  income shifting.  The 
dummy variables for the three most unambiguously low-tax regions-labeled 
Dragon, Ireland, and tax havens-all  have significant negative coefficients, 
suggesting  that U.S.  multinationals  operating there shift income out of  the 
United  States to these regions.  The dummy variables  for the two most un- 
ambiguously high-tax regions-Japan  and high-tax Europe-are  positive and 
significant,  suggesting that U.S.  multinationals operating there shift income 
from these regions into the United States. Furthermore, multinationals oper- 
ating in South Africa have increased U.S. tax liabilities, suggesting that non- Table 8.4  OLS Regressions Explaining U.S Federal Taxes Scaled by U.S. Assets or U.S. Sales 
U.S. Federal Tax per $ of  U.S. assets  U.S. Federal Tax per $ of U.S. Sales 
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Note:  Numbers in brackets are r-ratios. Control variables are scaled by worldwide total assets in (1) through (4) and by worldwide total sales in (5) through 
*Regression coefficients are significant and consistent with hypothesis. 
thvestment tax credit. 
a,b,cSignificant  at 18, 5%,  and lo%,  respectively. 
aI.bl,c'Significant  at]%, 5%, and lo%, respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
dHigh-tax  Europe is significant in (1) and (3) if firms with subsidiaries in only one region are excluded. 290  D.  Harris, R.  Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
tax reasons such as avoiding capital controls or political instability may also 
drive income shifting. 
The existence of subsidiaries in other Asian countries, Latin America, Af- 
rica, and the OPEC countries does not significantly affect U.S. tax liabilities. 
Multinationals operating there face conflicting incentives. On one hand, they 
have tax incentives to shift income from the United States into these regions, 
which generally have lower statutory tax rates than the United States does. On 
the other hand, multinational firms also have incentives to shift income out of 
these regions into the United States because of currency risks, political risks, 
capital controls, and so on. 
One initially surprising result is the negative coefficient for Canada, which 
had statutory rates comparable to but slightly higher than the U.S. rate during 
the sample period. However, Glenday and Mintz (1990) point out that a large 
and increasing proportion of Canadian firms were in surplus tax loss situations 
during the early 1980s-as  high as 61.4 percent in 1984-so  their effective 
marginal tax rates were lower than the statutory corporate rates. The same 
explanation applies to Australia and New Zealand in this period. Finally, the 
coefficient for low-tax Europe is positive and is significant in regressions (l), 
(2), and (4). Tax rates there are lower than in the United States because of 
generous tax holidays and other provisions. This result is puzzling, and we 
can only speculate that firms may be so constrained in using these schemes 
that their effective tax rates are actually not lower than in the U.S. 
As discussed above, the presence of  both intangibles and debt financing 
make income shifting easier. We  examine this idea by  introducing a cross- 
term between the regional dummies and a dummy indicating the presence of 
these cost-reducing factors. Research and development spending per dollar of 
total sales, or of total assets, is used to proxy for production-related intang- 
ibles. Similarly, advertising spending per dollar of total sales, or of total as- 
sets, is used to proxy for marketing-related intangibles. A firm with high in- 
terest expenses per dollar of  total sales or assets has more opportunities to 
shift income by concentrating its debt financing in highly taxed subsidiaries. 
To  capture these effects, we create a dummy variable equal to one for obser- 
vations in which any of these three variables is in the highest quartile of  the 
whole sample, and zero otherwise.13 This dummy indicates that the cost of 
income shifting may be 10w.I~  We repeat regressions (4) and (S), adding cross- 
terms between this “low-cost’’ dummy and the thirteen regional dummies in 
our regression analyses. The results are reported in table 8.5. 
These factors do appear to facilitate income shifting. Indeed, the movement 
of income to the United States from high-tax Europe and Japan seems to rely 
solely on them. The regional dummies themselves have insignificant coeffi- 
13. We  experimented with other definitions of  this interactive dummy variable and obtained 
14. Of the multinational firms in our  sample, 69 percent are  classified as having low cost in 
results similar to those reported below. 
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Table 8.5  OLS Regressions Explaining U.S. Federal Taxes Scaled by U.S. Assets or 
U.S. Sales: Cross-term Indicating Low-Cost Income Shifting Channels 
U.S. Federal Tax per $ of U.S.  U.S. Federal Tax  per $ of  U.S. 
Assets  Sales 
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Note: Numbers in brackets are t-ratios. 
*Results are consistent with hypothesis. 
'Regional dummy x dummy indicating low-cost income shifting channel 
a,b,cSignificant  at 1%, 5%, and lo%, respectively. 
bl.clSignificant  atl%, 5%. and 101,  respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
cients, while the cross-terms are positive and significant. Similar regression 
results for South Africa imply that income is shifted from there to the United 
States via these same factors. Our results also indicate that firms shift income 
to the United States from Africa, Ireland, and the Four Dragon countries (al- 
though the Four Dragon coefficient is insignificant) via these channels. The 292  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
income shifting from the United States to Canada detected in table 8.4 also 
appears to involve intangibles and/or debt-related channels. Note, however, 
that these factors may play a less critical role in income shifting to tax havens. 
The cross-term for the tax haven dummy is insignificant. 
The results in table 8.5 are not, however, nearly as statistically strong as 
those in table 8.4. The results for Australia and New Zealand, Latin America, 
and the low-tax European countries are not significant at all. The weakness of 
these results may be due to the inevitable collinearity between the cross-term 
and the regional dummies themselves. 
8.4  Statistical Issues 
In this section, we  examine the robustness of our results, focusing on the 
regressions reported in table 8.4, especially (4) and (8), and their statistical 
reliability. 
First we investigate the possibility that our results might be driven by out- 
liers.  Using regressions (4) and  (S), we  identify a firm as an outlier if  its 
studentized residual is greater than three.15 There are four outliers in regres- 
sion (4) and seven in regression (8).16  Both regressions were repeated without 
the outliers. The coefficient for the Japan dummy in (8) becomes insignificant 
but is still positive. In (4) with no outliers, Japan remains positive and signif- 
icant. Other regression results are not changed materially. We  conclude that 
our results are probably not driven by outliers. 
There may be heteroscedasticity and missing-variables problems in our re- 
gression. Heteroscedasticity could be caused by  less than perfect scaling of 
the dependent variable or by missing variables. However, heteroscedasticity- 
consistent t-statistics (see White  1980) are not materially different from the 
simple t-statistics we report. 
Missing variables can also bias the coefficient estimates. Recall that the 
numerator of our dependent variable can be expressed as T,(Y, -  YUL  + Y,,), 
where Y, is a firm’s U.S.  income and both Y,,  and Y,,  are shifted income. 
The problem of  missing variables may arise if we do not adequately control 
for variations in Y,.  Indeed, given the simple specification of our regression 
equations, it is likely that we do not capture all relevant control variables. 
We  examine the missing-variables issue by  repeating regressions (4) and 
(8), using a fixed-effects model. In other words, we regress the deviations of 
firms’ U.S. tax ratios from their sample period means (1984-88)  on the devia- 
tions of the independent variables from their respective sample period means. 
This  procedure  eliminates  the  impact on  the  dependent variable  of  firm- 
15. In (8), one of the identified outliers actually has a studentized residual of 2.975 and a Cook’s 
D  statistic of 0.084. No nonoutliers have Cook’s D  statistics greater than 0.025, and all but two 
have Cook’s D’s below 0.02. 
16. Two of the four outliers in regression (4) are multinational firms, as are four out of the seven 
outliers in regression (8). For the multinational firms, the prediction errors are all positive. Of the 
five uninational firms, three have positive prediction errors. 293  Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations 
specific but time-invariant missing variables that affect the dependent variable 
additively. 
Using this fixed-effects model, we obtain a positive coefficient for Canada, 
high-tax Europe, AustralidNew Zealand, and Latin America; we  obtain a 
negative coefficient for Japan, Four Dragons, other Asian countries, low-tax 
Europe, Ireland, South Africa, Africa, and tax havens.” No estimate is very 
significant. This is not surprising; we are suppressing much information with 
this technique, and it ignores any lags between incorporation of  an affiliate 
and the onset of  income shifting. Except for Japan and Latin America, the 
sign of  a coefficient is positive when the corresponding region’s tax rate is 
higher than in the United States and is negative when its tax rate is lower than 
in the United States. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mul- 
tinational firms shift income out of high-tax countries to the United States and 
into low-tax countries from the United States. 
A  subsidiary in  Latin America increases U.S. tax  liabilities in both the 
fixed-effects model and the simpler specifications reported in table 8.4. This 
again suggests that income may be shifted out of Latin America to avoid po- 
litical risks and capital controls, even though tax rates there are generally 
lower than in the United States. The negative sign for the Japan dummy indi- 
cates that our previous estimates of the impact of having a subsidiary in Japan 
on U.  S. tax liability may not be robust. 
The coefficients for Canada and AustralidNew Zealand now have positive 
signs, as our income shifting hypothesis predicts. This suggests that the neg- 
ative effect subsidiaries in these regions have on U.S. tax liability may be due 
to tax losses carried forward by  older subsidiaries. New subsidiaries owned 
by  firms first entering these regions may not be in this situation and thus face 
the actual higher statutory tax rate.I8 As a consequence, these firms shift in- 
come out of these regions to the United States. 
The fixed-effects model does not completely eliminate the problem caused 
by  not  fully controlling for a firm’s profits, because of  nonadditive or time 
varying effects. This is not just a statistical problem but also an economic 
issue. We therefore defer a more complete discussion to the next section. 
We  conclude that the regression results reported in table 8.4 do not appear 
to be driven by  heteroscedasticity or missing-variables problems. The effect 
that having Japanese subsidiaries has on U.S. tax liabilities is not, however, 
very robust. 
8.5  Economic Issues 
We  now turn our attention to the economic interpretation of our results. The 
question we address is whether or not there are sensible economic interpreta- 
tions for our findings other than income shifting. 
17. A dummy for OPEC is not included, because no firms have changed their presence there. 
18. This is certainly true of greenfield expansions. However, Canadian tax law allows the trans- 
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Our dependent variable is a firm’s current U.S. federal tax liability divided 
by  either its U.S.  assets or its U.S. sales. Due to repatriated income from 
foreign subsidiaries, this tax ratio may be higher for a multinational firm than 
for a domestic firm. U.S. tax laws imply that income repatriated from a sub- 
sidiary in a low-tax location increases federal taxes net of foreign tax credits, 
while income repatriated from a subsidiary in a high-tax location does not. 
Hence, income repatriation alone should lead to a positive, rather than nega- 
tive, regression coefficient for the  lower-tax regional dummies, while the 
higher-tax regional dummies should have a nonpositive impact on our depen- 
dent variable. However, we obtain negative regression coefficients for the low- 
tax regional dummies and positive coefficients for the high-tax regional dum- 
mies. Thus, our results are clearly not due to income repatriation. 
Our results might be driven by  macroeconomic factors such as regional 
economic performance and changes in exchange rates. It is conceivable that 
such changes in the economic situation of a foreign host country might have a 
significant impact on the firm’s U.S. profits and, thus, on its U.S. taxes. To 
ascertain that our results are not due to transitory macroeconomic changes, 
we repeat regressions (4) and (8) in table 8.4 using year-by-year data. The 
results are reported in tables 8.6 and 8.7. 
The year-by-year regressions generate very consistent results. The signs of 
the regression coefficients for the separate years are identical and are also 
identical to the full-sample estimates except for Japan, low-tax Europe, and 
Latin  America.  However, as should be  expected given  the  much  smaller 
sample sizes, the statistical significance of the coefficients is attenuated. The 
lack of consistency in the coefficient estimates for low-tax Europe and Latin 
America is also not particularly surprising given that we do not obtain signif- 
icant results in the pooled sample analysis. Japan aside, our findings do not 
appear to be driven by transitory regional macroeconomic factors.  l9 
Another possible problem is that there might be a relationship between firm 
19. Because our data include years before and after the Tax Reform Act of  1986 (TRA86), it is 
also potentially instructive to look at any differences in the estimated relationships across the two 
periods.  TRA86 lowered the corporate statutory tax rate from 46 percent to 40 percent in 1987 
and to 34 percent  in  1988 and thereafter. This change by  itself should increase the amount of 
income shifting from high-tax countries into the United States and decrease the amount of income 
shifting from the United States to low-tax countries. TRA86 also increased the likelihood that a 
firm will be in excess foreign tax credit status. This development increases the payoff to income 
shifting, because it reduces the likelihood that changes in taxes paid to foreign governments will 
trigger offsetting changes in the amount of foreign tax credit granted by the U.S. government. In 
the aggregate, then, following TRA86 there should be more income shifted out of high-tax foreign 
countries, while the change in income shifted into low-tax countries is less certain. No such pat- 
tern is apparent in table 8.7. However, two further considerations make the story more compli- 
cated. First, TRA86 also restricted the ability to average foreign taxes in the calculation of foreign 
tax credits. Second, because of the gradual phase-in of the tax rates, there were important incen- 
tives to change the timing of income realizations. This renders data from 1987 and 1988 somewhat 
suspect as an indicator of steady-state behavior and makes 1986  data suspect as a sample of typical 
pre-TRA86 behavior.  For a more  detailed  discussion  of  TRA86, see Slemrod  (1990).  Harris 
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Table 8.6  Year-by-Year OLS Regressions of U.S. Federal Tax/U.S.  Assets, 1984 
through 1988. 
Year 
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*Sign of  coefficient is significant with hypothesis in all years. 
a.b.cSignificant  at 1%, 5%,  and 108,  respectively. 
al.bl.c'Significant  at 1%, 5%, and lo%, respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
profitability and the location of  subsidiaries. If  affiliate locations and actual 
U.S. profits are both related to unobservable differences in a firm's profitabil- 
ity, then the estimated coefficients of table 8.4  will be biased estimates of the 
magnitude of income shifting made possible by  multinational operation. The 
ideal procedure for dealing with this problem is to construct a structural model 
of the joint decisions of where to locate and how much income shifting to do, 
estimated perhaps by a two-stage least squares procedure where, in the equa- 296  D. Harris, R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung 
Table 8.7  Year-by-Year OLS Regressions of U.S. Federal Tax/U.S. Sales, 1984 through 
1988. 
Year 
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*Sign of  coefficient is consistent with hypothesis in all years. 
A,b,cSignificant  at 1%, 5%,  and lo%, respectively. 
a'.bl,clSignificant  at 1%, 5%. and lo%, respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
tion for reported U.S.  tax paid,  actual location is replaced by  a predicted- 
location variable which is purged of  the unobservable influences that may be 
correlated with actual U.S . parent profitability. Although ideal, this procedure 
is difficult, fraught with its own problems and data difficulties. It is therefore 
left for future research. We employ simpler techniques. 
One simple approach is to repeat regressions (4)  and (8) in table 8.4, in- 
cluding consolidated before-tax income (scaled by either worldwide total as- 297  Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations 
sets or worldwide sales) as an additional control variable. While this proce- 
dure is statistically problematic because it induces a correlation between the 
regression residual and the added explanatory variable, it nonetheless sheds 
light on the robustness of the coefficient estimates for the regional dummies. 
The regression result is that the dummy for Japan becomes insignificant in the 
analog of regression (8) and negative in the analog of (4). The other coefficient 
estimates do not change materially, and significance levels actually increase 
slightly.20 
If a firm’s profitability is related to the location of its subsidiaries, the rela- 
tionship should also be captured in a regression of  a firm’s global after-tax 
income on the regional dummies. Results of this procedure are reported in the 
left panel of  table 8.8. Regressions (1) and (2) explain global after-tax in- 
come, using the regional dummies and control variables including industry 
dummies. The dependent variable in the former is scaled by worldwide assets 
and in the latter by worldwide sales. The dummy for Japan in (1) has a signif- 
icant positive coefficient.21  Those for Canada, Europe, and South Africa are 
positive and insignificant. Subsidiaries in Asia, the Four Dragons, Ireland, 
AustralidNew Zealand, Latin America, OPEC, Africa, and the tax havens are 
insignificantly related to lower U. S. taxes (the Four Dragons group borders on 
significance). We conclude that a relation between profitability and subsidiary 
location does not explain away our results. 
Our results might also be capturing scale economies embedded in multina- 
tionals. An important explanation for the existence of multinational firms, the 
internalization theory (see Caves 1986), posits that having subsidiaries in any 
large foreign market leads to higher returns on certain intangibles. According 
to this view, multinational firms possess information-based intangible assets 
with public good properties. Technological know-how, marketing expertise, 
and exceptional management could be such goods. Due to well-known prob- 
lems stemming from the economics of information, normal markets for these 
goods may not exist.  Because of their public good properties, these assets 
should be applied on as large a scale as possible to maximize firm value. The 
solution is  to  expand  the  firm’s scale:  internalizing  markets for  these  in- 
tangibles.  Including R&D  spending and  advertising expenses (proxies for 
technology- and marketing-related intangibles, respectively) as independent 
variables is intended in part to control for this effect. If  internalization is not 
entirely controlled for, however, our results could be affected. 
Internalization could thus imply that having generic foreign subsidiaries 
increases profits and therefore taxes-especially  if  the subsidiaries allow ac- 
cess to large markets. While the positive coefficients on high-tax area dum- 
20. The procedure discussed in the text does not eliminate the potential simultaneity bias but 
instead changes the nature of the bias and, under certain assumptions, changes its sign. Thus,  the 
fact that the qualitative nature of the results is not altered by including the worldwide profitability 
variable implies that they are not an artifact of this sort of simultaneity bias. 
2 1.  Given the alleged entry barriers in Japan, it may not be surprising that successfully entering 
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Table 8.8  Regressions of Global After-Tax Income and  Global Taxes on 
Regional Dummies and Control Variables 
Global Income  Global Tax 
Assets  Sales  Assets  Sales 
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total sales in (3) and (4). 
Note: Numbers in brackets are t-ratios. 
a.b.cSignificant  at 1%. 5%, and lo%, respectively. 
mies could be due in part to internalization-related profits, the negative coef- 
ficients on  low-tax region dummies are unambiguous evidence of  income 
shifting. Moreover, the low-cost income shifting indicator variable in table 
8.5 also serves as an indicator of some of  the assets likely to lead to internali- 
zation profits: technology and marketing ability. Internalization theory implies 
that the cross-product terms should all be positive. Again, this is so only for 
high-tax countries. Intangibles are associated with lower U.S. taxes when the 
firm has a subsidiary in a low-tax region. This result is consistent with income 299  Income Shifting in U.S.  Multinational Corporations 
shifting. We conclude that while our results for high-tax areas may be affected 
by  internalization,  those for low-tax regions  unambiguously  imply income 
shifting from the United States to low-tax countries. 
Finally, an alternative approach to testing for income shifting is to run re- 
gressions explaining total worldwide taxes. in the absence of income shifting, 
dummies indicating a firm’s presence in high-tax regions should have positive 
coefficients, while dummies indicating a presence in low-tax regions should 
have zero or negative coefficients, depending on how much income is repatri- 
ated. income shifting should reduce the positive coefficients of high-tax re- 
gion  dummies. Indeed, enough  should render them  insignificant.  Further- 
more,  income  shifting  implies  that  low-tax  region  subsidiaries should  be 
associated with a reduction in worldwide tax, as does the absence of income 
shifting. Thus income shifting implies insignificant coefficients for high-tax 
regions and uninterpretable results for low-tax regions. Although we feel that 
this is not an ideal hypothesis for statistical verification, we present the results 
of such regressions in the right panel of table 8.8. 
Regressions (3) and (4) explain global taxes, using regional dummies and 
control variables  including industry dummies.  The scaling factor in (3) is 
worldwide assets and that in (4) is worldwide sales. The general insignific- 
ance of the high-tax region dummies is consistent with income shifting. Again 
Japan does not fit the pattern. Also, consistent with income shifting, the coef- 
ficients of the low-tax region dummies are either negative or insignificant. We 
conclude that the lack of results in regressions of this form is consistent with 
income shifting. 
In summary,  our regression results are most readily  interpretable  as evi- 
dence for income shifting. The estimated impact of  having a subsidiary in 
Japan on a firm’s U.S. tax may, however, be due to factors other than income 
shifting. 
8.6  Economic Significance 
So far, the focus of this paper has been entirely on whether or not the pattern 
of  signs obtained in the regression analysis is consistent with the hypothesis 
that multinational firms engage in income shifting. in this section, we reflect 
on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and the implied economic ef- 
fect. We concluded above that the various statistical and economic problems 
inherent in this study cannot explain away the basic result that income shifting 
occurs. We do not, however, deny that some of them may adversely affect the 
precision of our point estimates. In particular, if the scale of affiliate opera- 
tions, which we are unable to control for, is related to the magnitude of in- 
come shifting, the precision of our estimates may be diminished. We therefore 
must proceed into the following discussion with this caveat in mind. 
A second caveat is that this analysis compares the U.S. taxes of firms with 
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nalization theory suggests that multinational operations enhance profitability. 
A multinational structure therefore should be related to higher U.S.  taxes- 
due to higher profits-even  in the absence of income shifting. On average, as 
table 8.3 shows, multinational firms in our sample do have higher U.S. tax 
liabilities than uninational firms do. The average multinational has a U.S. tax 
bill equal to 3.3 percent of its assets and 2.4 percent of its sales. The average 
uninational’s tax bill is only 3.0 percent of  assets and 2.2 percent of  sales. 
Since we use uninational firms’ taxes as our benchmark rather than what the 
multinationals’ taxes would be absent income shifting, all of  our estimates 
understate the tax reduction due to income shifting. 
We  use the regression results reported in table 8.4 to estimate the effect of 
income shifting on overall U.S. corporate tax revenues. The dot product of 
the vector of regression coefficients on the regional dummies with the vector 
of regional dummies for a firm is an estimate of the effect of income shifting 
on that firm’s U.S. tax ratio. Multiplying this by the scaling variable gives a 
dollar estimate of  the change in  the firm’s U.S. tax liability due to income 
shifting. Results from this calculation suggest that income shifting does re- 
duce U.S.  tax revenue. This happens even though the average tax ratios of 
multinationals in table 8.3 are higher than those of uninational firms. This is 
because multiplying through by  the scaling factor reveals large dollar value 
tax reductions for the biggest firms in our sample. These dominate the dollar 
value  sums.  The  size  of  the  reduction  in  U.S.  tax  revenues depends on 
whether table 8.4’s regression (4) or (8) is used. The overall reduction is 3 
percent of U.S. tax liability based on regression (4) and 22 percent based on 
regression (8). Obviously, the difference between these two estimates shows 
that this exercise is not very precise.** 
Whatever the reduction in U. S. tax receipts, it appears to be due to income 
shifting by  very large multinationals. Firms with subsidiaries in  more than 
five regions show lowered U.S. tax bills. Based on (4) in table 8.4, the aver- 
age multinational firm with subsidiaries in more than five regions uses income 
22. The individual  coefficients of  specific regional dummies can also be  interpreted.  As an 
example, the estimated coefficient from table 8.4’s regression (4) on the regional dummy for 
Ireland is -0.0145.  This implies, ceteris paribus, that having an affiliate in Ireland is associated 
with a reduction in the ratio of U.S. income to U.S. assets of  ,0352 (.0145 divided by the average 
U.S. tax rate of ,412). For a multinational firm with U.S. assets equal to five times its Irish assets, 
the implied jump in the Irish income to assets ratio is.0.176.  The aggregate income to assets ratio 
in 1982 for U.S. affiliates in Ireland was 0.23. This rather large estimate is consistent with the 
qualitative findings of the previous studies discussed in section 8.1. Of course, these estimates are 
for an  average firm. For a multinational  with a very small presence in Ireland, this technique 
probably produces far too high an estimate of the actual amount of income shifting. In an oral 
communication  to the authors, Peter Wilson has  suggested that firms with Irish or tax haven 
subsidiaries may be more likely to have Puerto Rican subsidiaries as well. Our data sources do not 
include Puerto Rican operations in the lists of foreign subsidiaries. It is therefore possible that the 
Ireland and tax haven dummies are picking up the effects of  income shifting to Puerto Rico. Also 
in an oral communication, James Hines has suggested that firms that are more aggressive in saving 
U.S. taxes are more likely to have subsidiaries in Ireland and other tax havens; part of the large 
negative effect of  these regional dummies may be explained by this. 301  Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations 
shifting to reduce its U.S. taxes to 51.6 percent of what they would otherwise 
be. Based on (8), this falls to 50.6 percent. This implies that when the various 
control variables  and  industry effects are taken  into  account, large multi- 
nationals have lower U.S. tax bills than comparable uninational firms do. 
In contrast, multinationals with subsidiaries in five or fewer regions show 
elevated U.S. tax bills. While the simple sums of the regression coefficients 
for  the  regional  dummies  are  negative,  -.0352  for  regression  (4)  and 
-  .0215 for (8), weighting the sums by  the means of  the regional dummies 
turns them positive: .0116 for (4)  and .0016 for (8). This implies that when 
the various control variables and industry effects are taken into account, a 
multinational with subsidiaries everywhere has a reduced U.S. tax ratio, while 
the average multinational has a higher U.S. tax ratio than a comparable uni- 
national firm.23 
Although the uncertainties inherent in our methodology make estimates of 
the dollar value of income shifting imprecise, we can draw some qualitative 
conclusions about economic significance. First,  income  shifting probably 
reduces overall U.S. tax receipts. Second, this is largely due to the largest 
multinationals using  income  shifting to  substantially lower their  U.S.  tax 
bills. Third, the typical multinational has a higher U.S. tax liability than does 
a similar uninational firm. The last finding could be due either to higher earn- 
ings stemming from internalization or to a net inflow of shifted income to the 
United States. The ability of the largest multinationals to reduce their U.S. 
taxes is, however, most likely due to income shifting. 
8.7  Conclusions 
We  examine five years of data from the annual reports of two hundred U.S. 
manufacturing corporations. We  find that U.S. tax liability, as a fraction of 
either U.S.  sales or U.S. assets, is related to the location of foreign subsidi- 
aries in a way that is consistent with tax-motivated income shifting. Having a 
subsidiary in a tax haven, Ireland, or one of the Four Dragon Asian countries 
(all jurisdictions with low tax rates) is associated with lower U.S. tax ratios. 
Having a subsidiary in a high-tax region is associated with higher U.S.  tax 
ratios. These results suggest that U.S. manufacturing companies are able to 
shift income out of  high-tax countries into the United States and from the 
United States to low-tax countries. This behavior reduces U.S. taxes substan- 
tially only for firms with an extensive multinational structure. For multina- 
23. Regressions (3) and (4)  in table 8.8  generate similarresults. Morck and Yeung (1991, 1992) 
find that multinational structure and expansion increase firm value only if intangibles are present. 
Since firms with intangibles may be able to engage in income shifting more easily, a niiive inter- 
pretation of their results is that the increased value is due to  reduced taxes. However, the average 
multinational pays more worldwide taxes than does a similar uninational firm, presumably be- 
cause it is more profitable. The increased value must therefore be due to factors such as the inter- 
nalization of foreign markets rather than to reduced taxes. Reduced taxes might explain increased 
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tional firms as a whole, income shifting leads to a moderate reduction in ag- 
gregate  U.S.  tax  payments.  Finally,  our  results  support  the  idea  that 
multinational  firms  conduct  income  shifting for  non-tax-related  purposes, 
such as avoiding capital controls and reducing political risks. 
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Comment  John Mutti 
This paper is a welcome addition to the literature on income shifting by md- 
tinational  corporations (MNCs). Most previous work has been based on n- 
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come reported by U.S. affiliates abroad, aggregated by country location. The 
authors instead use microdata for individual U.S.  parent firms. Thus, their 
work does not remassage a well-used data set but introduces another perspec- 
tive from which to assess the extent of  income shifting. Furthermore, this 
approach allows explicit consideration of the extent of  profit shifting out of 
the United States, something which could only be acknowledged implicitly in 
previous studies. 
The paper is controversial because it finds very strong income shifting ef- 
fects, not just from affiliates in high-tax countries to affiliates in low-tax coun- 
tries but  from the U.S. parent to affiliates in low-tax countries. This latter 
finding particularly might cause the policy-oriented reader to ask whether IRS 
enforcement  of  current  transfer  pricing  regulations  is  ineffective.  Critics 
of  current policy  might suggest that  the United  States should abandon its 
traditional reliance on arm’s-length transfer pricing to determine the intema- 
tional allocation of income and instead should adopt some worldwide apportion- 
ment  formula  or otherwise impose some minimum presumptive corporate 
income tax. 
While the authors avoid any sweeping calls for reform, they clearly want 
us to take their results seriously. Their central thesis, that substantial income 
shifting occurs, is supported in several alternative formulations of the depen- 
dent and independent variables. Also, the authors confirm that outlier obser- 
vations are not driving their results. Such a focus on individual observations 
is always a useful check on data entry and on subsequent inferences that can 
be misleading when a few extreme entries account for the significance of par- 
ticular variables. 
In short, the authors make good use of  their data set to suggest the scope 
and form of tax-motivated income shifting behavior. Nevertheless, there are 
several additional issues that merit attention with respect to the authors’ meth- 
odology and the inferences to be drawn from their results. 
One question rests on a simple issue of definition. Are the subsidiaries re- 
ported by  the authors majority-owned subsidiaries, or do they use a lower 
degree of control, such as the 10 percent ownership figure used in the bench- 
mark survey? If  the latter is true, do the same costs and benefits of income 
shifting apply? If the former is true, do the authors lose important information 
regarding the way business is conducted in certain countries? For example, 
according to the  1982 benchmark survey, majority-owned affiliates account 
for less than a quarter of  all U.S.  affiliate sales in Japan, and less than  10 
percent of all U.S. affiliate sales in Korea. Given the lack of robustness of the 
Japanese country dummy in the empirical results, this ownership distinction 
may be relevant. 
A second data question involves the sample of firms considered. The choice 
to use parent firms in SICS 30 to 39 means that pharmaceuticals are not in- 
cluded in the data set. The strength of  any Irish relationship is likely to be 
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ents in the aggregate should be  recognized as contingent on  this particular 
subsample. 
Another important issue involves the authors’ estimation technique. Re- 
gressions (4) and (8) in table 8.4 are based on OLS estimates from panel data 
covering five years and roughly 95 firms. The authors recognize that alterna- 
tive approaches may be preferable. They refer to estimates from a fixed-effects 
model, which does not impose the constraint implicit in the OLS framework 
that the intercept term is the same for all firms. However, the authors never 
report the corresponding F-statistic to test whether imposing such a constraint 
in regressions (4) and (8) is consistent with the data or not. 
As noted by the authors, in the fixed-effects  framework, the relevant obser- 
vations are the deviations from the sample period means for each firm. For a 
parent firm that has an Irish affiliate in all five years of the sample, there is no 
deviation from the sample mean; the only nonzero country dummy observa- 
tions that will appear in the regression are those where affiliates are estab- 
lished or disposed of within the sample period. The authors might usefully 
note frov the raw data whether that sort of  activity is observed for a large 
proportion of the firms included. Also, what countries have seen the biggest 
changes in the numbers of affiliates located there? Do these trends primarily 
suggest a growing attraction of tax haven operations, as noted by Hines and 
Rice (1990) over the 1977-82  period, or is expansion into other countries just 
as common and therefore just as likely to be reflected by within-firm disper- 
sion over the sample period? 
Another variable whose performance in the fixed-effects  formulation would 
likely be affected is the dummy to show a low cost of  transferring income. 
Because this dummy is created from those firms in the upper quartile of R&D 
intensity or those firms in the upper quartile of reliance on debt finance, we 
again must ask whether such firm rankings are likely to change over the five- 
year panel or whether little within-firm variation will be observed. 
Analysis of panel data by Gordon and Jun (ch. 1 in this volume) includes 
another potentially preferred alternative to OLS estimation, a random-effects 
model. Such a model would take into account the likely correlation of  error 
terms across years for a single firm; that is, if a firm’s tax-sales ratio is under- 
estimated in one year due to omitted firm-specific information, it is likely to 
be underestimated in other years, too. Attention to this firm-specific variance 
might be warranted in generalized least squares estimates. 
At a more general level, the estimates of regressions (4) and (8) rely upon a 
dummy variable to indicate the presence of an affiliate within a country, be- 
cause the authors have no data on the scale of affiliate operations. By impli- 
cation, just being in  a tax haven allows the firm to shift enough income to 
eliminate practically its entire U.S. tax liability. Such an interpretation is not 
very convincing; otherwise, we would expect all firms to follow this pattern 
and operate in a tax haven. Ideally, we would like to know more about each 
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an affiliate also is an endogenous tax strategy choice. The authors address this 
concern in part by  interacting country dummies with another dummy, based 
on firm intangibles and interest payments, that represent a low cost of trans- 
ferring income. The results from this exercise are reported in table 8.5, and I 
regard them as potentially relevant in addressing the larger issue of how much 
income shifting occurs and who does it most successfully. 
The size of the estimated coefficients carries strong implications for policy. 
At one level, the authors assess whether the opportunity to establish foreign 
affiliates allows U.S. firms to reduce their U.S. tax liability. Based on table 
8.4 estimates, the authors conclude that the largest MNCs seem most able to 
reduce their U.S. payments through profit shifting. In this context, “largest” 
implies MNCs with six or more foreign affiliates. From information in a more 
complete version of the paper, firms with six to nine affiliates did not seem 
that much different in terms of total U.S. tax due, after correcting for income 
shifting behavior,  than  firms  with  four or  five affiliates. The first group, 
though, did more aggressively reduce their U.S. tax liability. This observation 
indicates that the U.S. tax disparity might be regarded as much a matter of 
horizontal equity as it is vertical equity. 
The fact that two companies may be the same size but one takes a much 
more aggressive stance than the other to minimize its U.S. taxes suggests that 
accurate identification of these aggressive minimizers is important in project- 
ing both the aggregate fiscal effect and the proper characterization of  those 
able to reduce their U.S. tax. A potential way of presenting this perspective 
would be to make calculations comparable to those reported above but based 
on the table 8.5 estimates rather than the table 8.4 estimates. Such a procedure 
would be  another indication of  the robustness of the possible policy infer- 
ences. 
Specific country dummies are intriguing as well, and the authors devote a 
footnote to explaining their Irish coefficient. They note that  if U.S. parent 
firms maintain about five times as many assets in the United States as they do 
in  Ireland, then the estimated coefficient of  shifting of  income out of  the 
United States to Ireland indeed explains most of the income declared in Ire- 
land. While this example may  suggest that the coefficient estimate is plau- 
sible, it also raises a more basic question: how many U.S. parents keep such a 
high proportion of their assets in Ireland? 
Although we have no precise survey data to address this question, two in- 
dications are possible. One is based on the  1982 benchmark survey, from 
which we can tell the total assets of manufacturing parents, the amount held 
overseas, and the amount held  in Ireland. Calculate the assets held  in  the 
United States by MNC parents and multiply that number by the percentage of 
firms the authors report as having Irish affiliates. By  that procedure, U.S. 
parents of Irish affiliates held $98 billion of assets in the United States, while 
their holdings in Ireland were $4.5 billion. Thus, the authors’ one to five ratio 
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relationship reported in the benchmark data, the much smaller proportion of 
assets in Ireland implies that all of the income declared in Ireland is too small 
to account for the reduction in U.S. income tax that we would infer from the 
estimated coefficient. 
An even more extreme judgment comes from examining the assets declared 
by  parents that repatriate income from Irish affiliates. According to  Form 
11  18s filed in 1986, U.S. parents claimed assets of $2.4 trillion, while Bureau 
of Economic Analysis annual survey data indicate the corresponding Irish as- 
sets that year were $11.2 billion. If, instead, the authors’ one to five ratio of 
Irish to U.S. assets were to hold, U.S. assets in Ireland would have to exceed 
$350 billion, a very significant figure in a country with a gross domestic prod- 
uct of less than $25 billion. As a consequence, we again question whether the 
Irish coefficient shows too great a reduction in U.S. income. 
The authors note a suggestion from G. Peter Wilson that their Irish variable 
may be highly collinear with an important omitted variable: does the parent 
also have a possessions corporation (an entity regarded as a domestic corpo- 
ration) in Puerto Rico? Income shifting to reduce a firm’s U.S.  tax liability 
clearly occurs, but the estimated coefficient captures both the portion of  in- 
come that goes to Ireland and the portion that goes to Puerto Rico. This plau- 
sible line of reasoning preserves the authors’ contention that their results dem- 
onstrate significant income shifting ability of U.S. MNCs. 
However, a large Irish coefficient cannot be interpreted as a sign that greater 
audit resources ought to be devoted to investigating the transactions of  the 
Irish affiliate or that existing regulations are deficient in limiting the types of 
tax-saving strategies possible in Ireland. Rather, the policy implication may 
be to leave provisions affecting Ireland unchanged and instead to overhaul the 
possessions corporation provisions. From an alternative perspective, several 
changes have been  made in U.S. tax law and administration that would be 
expected to raise the cost of shifting income to Ireland. For example, Internal 
Revenue Code section 367 was  changed in  1984 to restrict the transfer of 
intangibles to foreign corporations. More recently, modifications were made 
in section 482 transfer pricing regulations, which established the expectation 
that foreign corporations must pay  appropriate royalties to the U.S.  parent, 
and Wilson reports substantial penalties assessed under section 6662 against 
firms found guilty of transfer price infractions. In spite of these changes, re- 
gression estimates of  the Irish coefficient may  show little of  this effect, be- 
cause of the continued ability of the parent to shift income to Puerto Rico. 
A second country effect of interest is found in the case of tax havens. A key 
question becomes what tax benefits U.S. firms gain from shifting income to 
tax havens if that income generally will be subject to immediate taxation by 
the United States under subpart F of  the Internal Revenue Code. One possibil- 
ity  is that the U.S. parent has excess foreign tax credits from other foreign- 
source income, so any additional foreign-source income declared in a low-tax 
country will be free of U.S. tax. Altshuler and Newlon (ch. 3 in this volume) 307  Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations 
report the likelihood that U.S. parent firms fell into that position during the 
1980-86  period. Of  additional interest as that data series is extended would 
be a distribution showing the extent to which firms have either an excess or 
deficit of foreign tax credits. For small variation around a norm of zero excess 
credits, we might surmise that transactions with the tax haven affiliate reflect 
a low cost of implementing a tax-minimizing strategy, whereas a consistently 
large surplus position suggests much higher costs of shifting income. 
In conclusion, these comments are intended to indicate that drawing con- 
clusions from the authors’ study is not straightforward. They have done com- 
mendable work in assembling a panel of firms for whom foreign affiliates can 
be identified, and their results clearly support the view that income shifting 
occurs. The location of affiliates in Ireland, the Four Dragons, and tax havens 
seems to account for lower parent tax payments in the United States; whether 
this relationship is changing over time, responsive to U.S. tax policy reforms, 
or stable and independent of U.S. measures in the international arena cannot 
be  established. The authors’ alternative empirical perspective for analyzing 
the question of income shifting is an excellent base for further analysis, which 
awaits the accumulation of more years of data and more-specific information 
regarding the parents’ reliance on other tax strategies such as possessions cor- 
porations. This Page Intentionally Left Blank